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Abstract. Using a testbed with reference timestamping, we collected
timing data from public Stratum-1 NTP servers during the leap second
event of end-June 2015. We found a wide variety of anomalous server-
side behaviors, both at the NTP protocol level and in the server clocks
themselves, which can last days or even weeks after the event. Out of 176
servers, only 61% had no erroneous behavior related to the leap second
event that we could detect.
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1 Introduction
Timekeeping is central to network measurement. It is a service typically provided
by a computer operating system, whose system clock is synchronized, through
timestamp exchange over the Network Time Protocol (NTP), to a remote ref-
erence. In the timeserver hierarchy, a Stratum-s timeserver synchronizes to a
Stratum s−1. Anchoring the system are the Stratum-1 servers, which have local
access to reference hardware such as a GPS receiver or atomic clock. These roots
of the timing forest ‘hierarchy’ can be PCs, or dedicated network appliances.
Network timing distributes Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). This is a
discontinuous time standard: jumps known as leap seconds are inserted (roughly
every two years) in order to keep the timescale in step with the solar day. Leap
seconds are propagated through the server hierarchy, but it is well known to
system administrators and others that this process is far from perfect, and can
cause havoc with system clocks and the host systems themselves.
In this paper we examine the behavior of a set of public Stratum-1 servers
during the leap second event of end-June 2015. Our objective is to determine
which servers perform as expected, both from the server-clock accuracy and pro-
tocol points of view, and to characterise the deviations. We find that behavior
which is far from ideal is quite common, and there are many examples of ex-
tremely poor behavior, for example servers which never incorporate the leap
second, or never inform their clients of it. Ideal behavior, as far as we can mea-
sure it given the resolution of our dataset, occurs in only 61% of the servers we
study. Given their role in the foundation of the timing system, these Stratum-1
findings are bad news for the public timing system as a whole.
2Our conclusions are based on measurements using reference timestamps from
a GPS synchronized DAG packet capture card, and an analysis methodology
capable of disambiguating network events from server behavior. Although it has
limitations, most notably the fact that we are only capturing a subset of all
public Stratum-1’s, we know of no prior study of leap second events which has
the detail or precision of what we present here. We intend to make our data
available to the community.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on time
standards, leap seconds and NTP, and discusses prior work. Section 3 describes
our testbed, the selection of servers, what the datasets are and how they were
collected. Section 5 outlines the analysis procedure we employed to characterize
the nature of the leap second behavior of the servers, even in the face of significant
noise. Our results are detailed in Section 5, and finally, Section 6 discusses the
import of our findings.
2 Background
2.1 Time Standards and Leap Seconds
The primary international time standard is the Temps Atomique International
(TAI). It is based on combining the (relativistically corrected) outputs of high
precision atomic clocks in over 300 National Laboratories, including the USA’s
National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), and Australia’s Na-
tional Measurement Institute (NMI). The TAI is a continuous time scale, with
each second a standard SI second, and with epoch (origin) at HH:MM:SS =
00:00:10, 1st January 1972. It is best to think of TAI as a real number, in units
of seconds, since that epoch. Universal Time (UT1) is a descendant of Greenwich
Mean Time, a continuous time scale whose unequal seconds allow synchroniza-
tion to the solar day. Because the Earth’s rotation is slowing, UT1 is falling
progressively further behind TAI.
The primary time standard used for general timekeeping is Coordinated Uni-
versal Time (UTC). This is a discontinuous time scale with epoch at tTAI =
−10 sec, best thought of as TAI to which jumps of exactly 1 second have been
infrequently applied in order to keep UTC close (within 0.9 sec) to UT1. Within
UTC, a positive leap second manifests as a downward jump, slowing the clock
down with respect to TAI. Leap seconds, when needed, are added at the end of
the last minute of a month, typically June or December. Negative leap seconds
are defined but have never been used.
Realizations of both TAI and UTC are maintained by the Bureau interna-
tional des poids et mesures (BIPM). The timing standards body is the Inter-
national Telecommunications Union (ITU), but it is the International Earth
Rotation and Reference Systems Service (IERS) that decides on leap seconds,
and announces them months in advance via its biannual “Bulletin C”.
In this paper we focus on the leap second added at the end of June 30,
2015. The leap event was completed at 00:00:00 July 1st UTC when TAI was




TAI − 36. For convenience, we plot all
timeseries against a timescale “t”, which is tTAI with its origin reset to t
∗
TAI.
2.2 Leap Seconds and NTP
The NTP hierarchy distributes UTC. Stratum-1 servers learn of leap seconds
through various mechanisms depending on the reference time source. The most
common is GPS, which supports UTC and makes complete leap second informa-
tion available. A commonly used alternative, used for example by many UNIX
operating systems, is to include a ‘leap-seconds’ text file as part of NTP config-
uration. This file, which lists leap second event times as well as an expiry date,
is maintained by NIST and is available from [1].
The main mechanism by which servers of higher strata learn of leap seconds
is via their server (or peer). The NTP packet header has a 2-bit Leap Indicator
(LI) field. RFC 5905 (NTP version 4), specifies that servers set LI = 01 in
response packets when a (positive) leap second is scheduled in the last minute
of the current month. Obsoleted RFCs 1305 (NTP v3) and 4330 (SNTP v4)
instead state .. in the last minute of the current day. The language in the RFCs
is ambiguous, as it confuses describing under what circumstances LI should be set
(to 01), with how far in advance to do so. A consistent reading across RFC 5905
and RFC 4330/1305 is that LI should be set in each server response packet during
the entire month (5905) or day (4330/1305) of a scheduled leap. Alternatively,
there may have been no intention to specify how far in advance to set it. Most
informal sources state that warnings are issued in the prior 24hrs in common
implementations. We discuss this further below.
The fact that UTC jumps backwards is inherently problematic. It is complex
and confusing, may break software reliant on monotonic time, and is fertile
ground for bugs. This is exacerbated by the fact that the detail of how time
should be kept during leap second events is not standardized: approaches vary
by operating system, OS version, and NTP version. Note that by ‘leap second
event’ here we mean the entire second just before the jump itself, since over
this interval clock software must do something non-standard to account for the
leap, including allowing the corresponding minute to have 61 seconds. A useful
reference here is [2]. As described in [3], using the ntpd daemon (the incumbent
clock synchronization algorithm for client system clocks developed by David
Mills [4]) with the -x option disables the sudden leap second adjustment and so
avoids a number of problems, but results in convergence times to post-leap UTC
of the order of 10’s of hours.
2.3 Prior Work
There are many informal reports available on-line detailing implementation is-
sues with leap seconds, describing bad behavior of client systems, related oper-
ating system bugs and configuration problems, and providing recommendations
for system administrators. For example contemporary issues in Linux (includ-
ing recommendations to simply shutdown NTP and restart around leap second
4events) can be found in [5, 6, 3]. RFC 7164 provides an overview of implemen-
tation issues in relation to POSIX. A recent paper by Burnicki [2] (see also the
related presentation [7]) gives a useful description of how leap seconds are dis-
seminated, and alternative proposals for how to deal with them in end systems,
including several ‘slewing’ variants, where a sudden jump is replaced by a pe-
riod of modified clock rate. This includes the slewing scheme included in NTP
for Windows, and that proposed recently by Google.
There is very little peer-reviewed work on Stratum-1 server behavior, and
still less on leap-seconds. The closest work appears to be that of Malone [8],
a web page which gives two graphs looking at LI values, of a similar set of
servers to ours, about the 2015, 2012, 2008 and 2005 leap second events. While
informative, the results are coarse grained, with scant methodological detail, and
do not extend to the server clocks themselves.
3 The Experiment: Testbed, Server List, and Data Set
The experiment ran over 22.3 days from June 29 to July 21, 2015. In it a single
host ran multiple independent RADclock [9] daemon instances. RADclock is an
alternative clock synchronization algorithm with high accuracy and robustness
[10]. Each instance emitted an NTP timing request packet every τ = 64 seconds
to its chosen server. Packets were timestamped to 200ns precision or better by a
DAG3.7GP capture card [11] via a passive tap just outside the host, synchronized
to a roof-mounted Trimble Acutime 2000 GPS receiver.
For an NTP packet i which completes its round-trip from the client to server
and back, and is successfully matched on return, we obtain a 4-tuple stamp of
UTC timestamps {Ta,i, Tb,i, Te,i, Tf,i}. Here Tb,i, Te,i are made by the server and
are extracted from the returning NTP packet, as are the LI bits and the server
Stratum field from the NTP header. For this experiment the configuration was
such that the DAG timestamps Ta,i, Tf,i ignore the leap second, and so are
on a continuous timescale (‘pre-leap UTC’) over the experiment.
Our server list is based on the public Stratum-1 url list maintained at ntp.org,
and contains 176 servers. Of these, 156 were listed as OpenAccess at ntp.org at
some time between Sep. 2011 and June 2015, and resolved to a unique IP address
which responded to NTP requests, during the experiment. To this we added 9
public and 6 private (3 from NMI and 3 in our lab) Australian Stratum-1 servers,
and 5 used by CAIDA Ark monitors [12].
4 Methodology
From the timestamp data we estimate, for each server, the time series of round-
trip time Ri = Tf,i − Ta,i, server change: Ci = (D↑i − D↓i )/2, and server error
Ei = Ci + Li. Here D
↑
i = Tb,i − Ta,i and D↓i = Tf,i − Te,i are the estimated
outgoing and incoming delays, and Li = L(Te,i), where L(t) is a step function














































Fig. 1. Introduction to server behavior and the methodology for TEB determination.
Left column: Good server; Middle: Bad server due to delayed leap; Right: Bad server
with delayed leap plus post-leap instability resulting in a much larger TEB.
the server clock with respect to the DAG timescale (resp. UTC), together with
‘noise’ due to path routing changes and congestion. We use Ri, which is entirely
independent of server timestamps and of the leap second event, to judge path
conditions independently of server behavior.
We illustrate our methodology through the examples appearing in Figure 1.
The server assigned the left column is well behaved, and so the top plot shows the
leap behavior in Ci one would expect. More precisely, the detected leap position
(black circle) at t = 51.7 sec is at the first stamp past t = 0, and the previous
stamp was at t = −13.5, before t = 0 as required. These values were determined
through inspecting Ei (middle plot), whose variability is steady about t = 0 in
a sub-ms band, showing no evidence of perturbations about the leap. Note that
Ei is centred about 5.2 ms rather than zero due to path asymmetry, not server
error. The level shift event in Ri at around 26 min does not appear in Ei as it
results from a symmetric path change.
The middle column exhibits a server where the leap occurs neatly, but is
t = 26.2 min late. We call this delay the Time to Expected Behavior (TEB).
After the leap Ei is 2 ms higher than it was before t = 0, however inspection
of Ri (and its median-filtered version, the black curve) in this zone reveals it
to be due to a path change affecting path asymmetry, rather than additional
leap-induced server errors. Hence the naive TEB value associated to the main
jump is taken as the final value.
The right column shows a server where not only is the initial leap late, but
there are additional errors beyond it of a few ms in amplitude (visible in Ei
but hidden in Ci) resulting in TEB = 75.8 min. The Ri plot confirms that
this ‘monotonic recovery’ event in Ei does not result from path effects but is
associated with the leap event at the server.










Fig. 2. A cumulative distribution function of TEB across all servers. Red stars denote
Bad servers. All servers with TEB < 64 sec (left of dashed line), are Good. The black
circles are LI-Bad, that is Bad with respect to LI behavior (see Section 5.2.)
Each server was closely examined using the above approach to determine
a TEB value which genuinely reflected recovery from the leap second event,
rather than any other cause. More precisely, for each server the TEB was set
to correspond to the earliest time at which the variations in Ei following a leap
fell below the magnitude of the path noise as revealed by Ri. The precise stamp
at which this occurs was selected ‘by eye’ taking into account the degree of
short term variability of each time series. In a small number of cases, the nature
and/or amplitude of the variability due either to path changes, congestion, or
server errors unrelated to the leap event, make the exact value of TEB hard to
evaluate, however we are confident that the resulting error is of the order of a
few percent even in these cases.
5 Results
5.1 Server Clock Behavior
We label a server clock as ‘Good’ (else ‘Bad’), with respect to its leap second
response, when there is no hard evidence of incorrect behavior. That is when Ei is
constant for all stamps both before and after t = 0, up to the observed variability
as calibrated by Ri. The value of this constant reflects path asymmetry, and is
close to zero relative to minimum RTT. Since the per-server periodic packet
flows have random phase with respect to each other, for such servers we expect
to find TEB values uniformly distributed in [0, τ ]. A consequence is that actual
detection resolutions can be both higher or lower than the (unfortunately low)
τ/2 = 32 sec average case. Note that lower values of τ would have run the risk





































Fig. 3. Examples of Bad servers with more extreme behavior (black circle = TEB).
We show Ci plots, as these have a range over 1 second and are thus well suited to
contextualize extreme errors. Note that correctness of the displayed TEB values cannot
be ascertained from this view. For that we require a zoomed view, such as Ei provides.
Figure 2 records the distribution of TEB values over servers in the form of
the empirical F (x) = Pr(TEB ≤ x). The values require a log scale as they are
spread over the entire 22 day experiment duration, including 2 cases where the
leap never occured (TEB set to trace duration). A single server jumped early, at
t = −0.164 sec, and could not be plotted. All 112 servers with TEB∈ [0, τ ] (left
of the dashed vertical line in plot) are, not surprisingly, Good, and inspection
in a linear plot showed they are uniformly distributed as expected, the smallest
being TEB = 0.13 sec. However, of the 131 Good servers, 19 have larger TEB
values because the server did not respond for an interval extending beyond [0, τ ].
Although values a little beyond t = τ could indicate congestion losses or server
overload, larger values imply a problem. Thus, for example, whereas TEB =
20 sec for a Good server is consistent with a sampling resolution of τ = 64 sec
and does not imply in any way that the server failed to leap for 20 seconds,
TEB = 100 sec for a Good server suggests that the server was not behaving
ideally (perhaps oﬄine as part of leap second management or failure), over this
entire period.
The 45 Bad servers display a wide variety of behaviors. The ‘delayed but
otherwise clean’ leap behavior encountered in the middle column of Figure 1 is
found in 15 cases, with a median delay at TEB = 22 min. For 5 other servers an
initial delay was accompanied by a significant period where the server did not
respond, but nothing more complex. The final 25 cases displayed more extreme
behavior including multiple jumps, failure to jump, and post-leap instability
occuring over periods ranging from hours to weeks. Figure 3 displays the Ci
8plots for a number of these. The bottom right plot deserves special mention.
It shows a server whose delayed but clean leap at TEB = 9.0 sec occurs in the
context of persistent and severe underlying server errors, which in fact are present
throughout the entire experiment. A number of both Good and Bad servers
display server errors unrelated to their performance during the leap event. A
detailed analysis of broader server anomalies is beyond the scope of this paper.
In [13] we perform such a study based on different and longer datasets from a
subset of the servers studied here.
5.2 Protocol Behavior
The most significant fact about the protocol compliance is that 41 of the 176
servers (24%) failed to set the LI bits correctly in any of the packets received
during the course of the experiment. NTP clients relying on these servers as a
reference, and their own clients lower in the hierarchy, would not have received
the warning about the impending leap second, and would therefore have failed to
insert it themselves, resulting in persistent errors and potentially serious conse-
quences, unless they received word by some other means (such as via a majority
of peers, or the leap-seconds file).
Of the 135 servers that did set the LI bits correctly, many did not do so in
an ideal manner. Consider first the times at which the servers ceased their leap
warnings. A total of 18 servers (13%) continued to set the LI bit after t = 0. Of
these only 8 had ceased after an hour, two continued for 12 days! and a further
2 for a week. Even a single packet with LI set received after t = 0 however has
the potential to cause the client to insert an additional leap second at the end of
the new month, July in this case. Presumably implementations will attempt to
disregard warnings received just after leap events to allow for delays in packet
arrival from the server(s), however they may not succeed, in particular if the
warnings continue indefinitely.
Now consider the times when the servers began to send warnings. As pointed
out earlier, it is not clear from the NTP standard when warnings should in
fact begin, however 24hrs seems to be commonly used/supposed, in particular
in SNTPv4 implementations (RFC 4330) which are still very common. In fact
in 6 out of the 135 cases we found that warnings began exactly 6 months in
advance! (We know this thanks to a complementary dataset we collected at that
time. Interestingly, this happens to correspond to 00:00:00 Jan 1st, the other
common time when leap seconds can be scheduled.). These extreme cases aside,
the warning start times of the remaining 135− 6 = 129 servers do cluster about
24hrs, as shown in the histogram of Figure 4. We see that in most cases ample
warning is given, provided the systems in question are up. There is no evidence
of warnings beginning a month in advance as, perhaps, suggested by RFC 5905.
Our results are consistent with the findings of Malone [8] for the same 2015
leap second event, who also reports that most leap second warnings begin close
to 24hrs in advance, and that around 60% to 80% of servers set the bits to the
right value, namely LI= 01, for a positive leap second. He also comments that







Fig. 4. Histogram of LI warning start times relative to t = 0 (excluding the 6 cases
where warnings began exactly 6 months in advance).
most servers had ceased their warnings by an hour after the event, in agreement
with our findings here.
5.3 Overall Behavior
A natural question to ask is, how many servers are ‘perfect’? meaning that
there is no evidence of errors of any kind with respect to the expected leap
second behavior, neither in the accuracy of the server clock timestamps, nor in
the protocol compliance.
To answer this question we must first define more precisely what we mean
by protocol compliance. We define the warning start time to be Good if it falls
in the interval [−24×3600,−3072] sec. Here we assume that a client is using
the maximum polling period to its server of τ = 1024 seconds, and allow for
2 consecutive packet losses (3×1024 = 3072) in order to define the last safe
time at which a server should begin delivering warnings. In terms of the warning
end time, we define behavior to be Good when no warnings are received after
t = 3 sec, to allow for worst case delay of a packet sent from the server at t = 0−
to the client. Finally, we consider that a server is ‘LI-Good’ if it sends LI warnings
in a way which is Good in each of the above two respects.
In Section 5.1 we reported that there were 131 Good servers, and using the
above definition we find that there are 115 LI-Good servers. The intersection of
these, the ‘Perfect’ servers, is 108 strong, or 61% of the total of 176 in the list.
Note that of the Perfect servers, 97 (90%) are among the servers with TEB <
64 sec from Figure 2. Finally, we should not forget that Perfect should not be
taken literally. It actually means that we found no hard evidence of failure in
our sampled data. In fact, as explained earlier, a number of Good servers have
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suspiciously large TEB values indicative of a server with poor availability, which
is not ideal server behavior, and of course our sampling resolution prevents us
from detecting servers with errors that were corrected quickly.
Although we have assembled our server list from sources either known to be
Stratum-1, or claiming to be through their presence on the list at ntp.org, it turns
out that not all of them are. In fact a considerable number drop their Stratum-
1 status every now and again (the S-varying group), and a small number were
never Stratum-1 over the duration of the experiment. Table 1 gives a breakdown,
and shows, for each stratum grouping separately, what percentages fall into the
Good, LI-Good, and Perfect performance categories. The differences are smaller
than one might imagine, with the S1-always servers doing a little better than the
others in terms of protocol compliance, but, counterintuitively, worse in terms
of clock accuracy. It should be noted however that the samples sizes are small.
In particular there is not a significant difference between the two most populous
and closely related categories, S1-always and S-varying, in either of the Good
and LI-Good groups.
S1-always S2-always S3-always S-varying NMI NIST
size 122 14 3 37 3 10
Good 72% 86% 67% 76% 100% 80%
LI-Good 66% 50% 67% 65% 100% 100%
Perfect 64% 50% 67% 54% 100% 80%
Table 1. Breakdown of different server groups that set LI bits into Good, LI-Good,
and Perfect subsets. Four measured stratum-level groups appear on the left, and two
National Laboratory groups on the right. The varying stratum category (S-varying)
consists of servers which are usually Stratum-1 but sometimes not.
A breakdown of two National Laboratory groups is also given in Table 1 on
the right hand side. This is interesting as we expect them to have the highest
standards, and in the case of NIST, a large client base. For NMI on the other
hand only registered clients are allowed – these are not public servers. Though
both NMI and NIST servers showed excellent protocol compliance, 2 of 10 NIST
servers in the list fell down on clock performance. Moreover, most of the NIST
servers exhibited server anomalies unrelated to the leap second event, whereas
none of the NMI servers did. This is in agreement with our findings in [13].
5.4 System Dependence
Information on the hardware and software platforms underlying the servers on
the list is available at ntp.org, however it is incomplete, potentially out of date,
and far from uniform. We are in the process of seeking out and contacting the
server administrators in order to obtain a more complete picture of variables
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such as the nature of the reference timing source, the origin of the server hard-
ware (commercial appliance or commodity), and operating system (proprietary,
Linux or BSD), and NTP version and configuration. It is not possible to report
on this in detail here, however it seems clear that, in agreement with the obser-
vations of Nelson in 1999 [14], that by far the most common reference source is
GPS. We also find that NTPv4 is more prevalent than NTPv3, and that both
commerical and commodity servers are well represented. The administrators and
their organisations span a broad range, from National Laboratories in the US,
Australia, Sweden, Russia and elsewhere, to time enthusiasts making servers
available out of personal interest. Many of the servers on the list participate in
the public ntppool.
6 Discussion
It is difficult to say how much influence the servers in our list have on public net-
work based timekeeping, in particular since the advent, since late 2013, of NTP
amplified reflection attacks [15], have caused administrators to block the server
query commands that would have made a crawl of their clients and peers possi-
ble. Certainly they are only a minority of the total number of publicly accessible
servers, given that Minar’s 1999 survey discovered 957 Stratum-1 servers [14].
On the other hand our list contains several servers from National Laboratories,
notably NIST, that can be expected to be well known with sizable client bases,
as well as many others which participate in the widely used ntppool. We believe
that it reasonable to claim that the deficiencies we have detailed in the paper,
where only 61% of servers are behaving (as far as we can tell) correctly, and
many behave in a very damaging way, can have a considerable impact.
Responding to leap seconds reliably is a complex affair, as it is a function of
many interactions of software and hardware of different generations and prove-
nance. The fact that in 2015 there are still so many issues, even in Stratum-1
servers, is a testament to this fact. For this reason it has been debated for some
time within the ITU whether leap seconds should be abandoned entirely. In fact
the ITU considered this question at the World Radiocommunication Conference
(WRC-15) meeting in November 2015 (after this paper was submitted to PAM
2016). The outcome was that more study was needed, and a report on future
time scales, including the fate of the leap second, will be considered by WRC-23
in 2023. The approach of this paper can be used as the basis of a broader study
of future leap second events leading up to 2023, as well as to track the health of
network timing infrastructure more generally.
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